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Abstract
A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distin-
guish between adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that dynamic
insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on
unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies
negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with
the number of past claims. We discuss econometric tests for the various
types of data that are typically available. Finally, we argue that dynamic
data also allow to test for adverse selection, even if it is based on asymmetric
learning.
∗Support from the NSF (grant #0096516) is gratefully acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, Free University, Amsterdam. This paper was written while Jaap
Abbring was visiting the Department of Economics of University College London. Abbring’s
research is supported by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
‡Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th
Street, Chicago IL 60637, USA. Tel. (1) 773 702 98 11, email: pchiappo@midway.uchicago.edu.
§Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
¶Université Paris X - Nanterre.
1. Introduction
For two decades, contract theory has remained a predominantly theoretical field.
However, a number of papers have recently been devoted to empirical applications
of the theory.1 It has been argued that insurance oﬀers a particularly promising
field for empirical work on contracts. Individual (automobile, housing, health,
life, etc.) insurance contracts are largely standardized. Researchers have access
to data bases of insurance companies, which typically contain several millions of
such contracts. The information in these data bases can generally be summarized
in a reasonably small number of quantitative and qualitative indicators. The
’outcome’ of the contract - be it the occurrence of an accident, its cost, or some
level of expenditure - is very precisely recorded in the firms’ files, together with
a detailed history of the contractual relationship (changes in coverage, etc.). Not
surprisingly, several recent papers are aimed at testing for the existence and esti-
mating the magnitude of asymmetric information eﬀects in competitive insurance
markets.2
A popular strategy for studying asymmetric information is to test, conditional
on observables, for a correlation between the choice of a contract and the oc-
currence or severity of an accident. Under adverse selection on risk, ’high risk’
agents are, everything else equal, both more likely to choose a contract with more
complete coverage and more likely to have an accident. The basic moral hazard
story is very close to the adverse selection one, except for an inverted causality.
In a moral hazard context, agents first choose diﬀerent contracts. Then, an agent
facing better coverage and, therefore, weaker incentives will be less cautious and
have more accidents. In both cases, the same pattern emerges: controlling for
observables, more comprehensive coverage should be associated with higher re-
alized risk - a property that can be tested using appropriate parametric or non
parametric techniques.
The conditional correlation approach has several advantages. It is simple and
very robust, as argued by Chiappori et al. (2002). Furthermore, it can be used
on static, cross-sectional data that are relatively easy to obtain. However, these
1See Chiappori and Salanié (2003) for a recent survey.
2Pueltz and Snow (1994), Dionne and Vanasse (1992), Chiappori and Salanié (1996, 2000),
Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (1997), Richaudeau (1999) and Dionne et al. (2001), to name
only a few, analyze automobile insurance contracts, while Holly et al. (1998), Chiappori, Durand
and Geoﬀard (1998), Chiappori, Geoﬀard and Kyriadizou (1998), Cardon and Hendel (1998)
and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) use health or life insurance data, and Poterba and Finkelstein
(2001) consider annuity contracts.
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qualities come at a cost. The past history of the relationship influences both the
current contract (through experience rating) and the agent’s behavior, and this
eﬀect is hard to take into account with cross-sectional data. More importantly,
the correlation is not informative on the direction of the causality, which makes
the two stories (moral hazard and adverse selection) very hard to distinguish.
Still, such a distinction is crucial, if only because the optimal form of regulation
of insurance markets varies considerably with the context.3
The research program summarized in the present paper relies on the insight
that the dynamic aspects of the relationship can help distinguishing between ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. Two approaches can be distinguished. First,
the form of optimal dynamic contracts diﬀers considerably between the two cases.
Thus, the qualitative properties of observed contracts may provide useful insights
into the type of problem they are designed to address. The research program
described in this paper concentrates on a second approach, in which the (possibly
suboptimal) contracts are taken as given and we concentrate on their implications
for observed behavior. In particular, most ’real life’ insurance contracts exhibit
some form of experience rating. A typical property of experience rating schemes
is that the occurrence of an accident shifts the entire incentive scheme the agent
is facing. Under moral hazard, this results in a form of autocorrelation in the
accident process. Thus, an empirical analysis of this process can be informative
on the presence of moral hazard.
In addition, dynamic data allow to address the problem of asymmetric learning.
Conventional wisdom suggests that, in many cases, asymmetric information may
not be present at the beginning of the relationship (e.g., the relative quality of a
young driver is unknown to her and her insurer). Rather, it emerges gradually as a
consequence of diﬀerent learning processes (say, the young driver learns from near
misses that are not even observed by the insurer). Then the contractual changes
that take place during the relationship may be informative about the agent’s
riskiness, even if the initial choice of a contract is uncorrelated with residual risk
(as found by most studies).
2. Dynamic moral hazard under experience rating: theory
The model is directly borrowed from Chiappori and Heckman (2000) and Abbring
et al. (forthcoming). We consider a dynamic version of an insurance model a
3For a review of various attempts to distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection,
see Chiappori (2000).
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la Mossin. Time is discrete. In each period t, the agent receives an income
normalized to one and may with some probability (1− pt) incur a fixed monetary
loss L. She is covered by an insurance contract involving a fixed deductible D and
a premium Qt that depends on past experience. Specifically, the evolution of Qt
is governed by the following ’bonus-malus’ system:
Qt+1 = δQt if no accident occurred at period t
= γQt if an accident occurred at period t
where δ < 1 < γ.4
The no-accident probability pt is subject to moral hazard. Specifically, in
each period t the agent chooses an eﬀort level et ≥ 0, resulting in a no accident
probability pt = p (et) for some increasing, concave function p. The cost of eﬀort
is assumed separable, i.e. the agent attaches utility
u (x)− e
to income x if he exerts eﬀort e, where u is increasing and strictly concave. The
horizon is infinite and agents maximize expected discounted utility.
According to the bonus-malus scheme, each accident shifts the incentive scheme
faced by the agent upward, thus modifying her incentives. It follows that the ’cost’
of an accident, in terms of higher future premia, depends on random events (the
sequence of future accidents) and endogenous decisions (the sequence of future
eﬀorts). Technically, the agent must solve a stochastic control problem. Here,
we simply summarize the main properties of the solution; the reader is referred
to Abbring et al. (forthcoming) for a precise analysis. A first result is that past
experience matters for the current decision only through the current level of the
premium; i.e., Qt is the only state variable of the control problem. Secondly,
the optimal eﬀort is increasing in the premium, at least when both the premium
and the deductible are small relative to the agent’s income. It follows that the
accident probability process of any given agent will exhibit a negative occurrence-
dependence property. In the absence of an accident, the premium - hence, by our
result, the agent’s incentives - decreases. Eﬀort is optimally reduced, resulting in a
4Proportional bonus-malus scheme of this type are empirically frequent. The French system,
wich is relevant for our empirical application, corresponds to δ = .95 and γ = 1.25. In addition,
the French system imposes a floor and a ceiling on θt, respectively equal to .5 and 3.5. In
our discussion of the French system, we ignore the fact that accidents occur continuously but
premiums are only updated annually. See Abbring et al. (forthcoming) for a formal discussion.
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steady increase of the accident probability. However, the occurrence of an accident
generates a discrete jump in the premium, which boosts incentives and ultimately
results in a drop in the accident probability. The main testable implication of the
model is thus the following:5
The accident process exhibits negative occurrence dependence, in the sense that
individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims.
This suggests that we can test for moral hazard by simply testing for negative
occurrence dependence in the raw data. One should however be careful at this
point. While moral hazard implies occurrence dependence eﬀects at the individual
level, individual claim intensities also vary with observed characteristics (such as
age, driving experience, region, etc.) and, more importantly, with unobserved
individual heterogeneity factors. In automobile insurance, for example, existing
work strongly suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is paramount. It is well
known that unobserved heterogeneity results in (spurious) positive occurrence
dependence in the data. The intuition is that those individuals whose risk is
persistently high for unobserved external reasons will be more likely to have had
accidents in the past and to have accidents in the future (in other words, to the
extent that ’bad’ drivers remain bad for at least a while, we should expect to
find a positive correlation between past and future accident rates). Of course,
this eﬀect, which is overwhelmingly confirmed by the data, does not contradict
the theoretical analysis sketched above: whatever the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity, it is still true that under moral hazard, the accident probability
of each individual decreases with the person’s number of past claims. But any
empirical investigation of this property must address the problem of disentangling
the ’true’, negative dependence induced by the dynamics of incentives from the
’spurious’, positive contagion generated by unobserved heterogeneity.
This problem is a manifestation of a general question, namely distinguishing
heterogeneity and state dependence. This issue has been abundantly discussed
in the labor literature since the seminal contribution of Heckman and Borjas
(1980). An interesting side aspect of our research, thus, is that it establishes a
link between an existing literature in labor economics and questions that arised
recently in applications of contract theory.
5An additional (and standard) diﬃculty comes from the fact that we observe claims, not
accidents, and that the decision to file a claim is endogenous. See Chiappori and Salanié (1998)
for a precise discussion of this problem.
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3. Testing for moral hazard
In most empirical studies in insurance, data are drawn from the files of one (or
more) insurance companies. Many relevant characteristics of the driver (age,
gender, place of residence, seniority, type of job, ...) and the car (brand, model,
vintage, power, ...) are used by companies for pricing purposes. All these are
available to the econometrician as well. The same is true for the characteristics
of the contract (type of coverage, premium, deductible,...). Finally, each accident
- or more precisely each claim - is recorded with all the relevant background
information.
The main diﬀerences between data sets can be traced back to the way past
history is recorded. Existing situations can be gathered in three broad cases:
• In the most favorable situation, the exact date of each accident is recorded.
Then the occurrence of an accident can be modelled in continuous time,
using event-history models.
• Many experience-rating schemes can be implemented with information on
the number of accidents in each contract year only. In such cases, insur-
ance companies will often only provide researchers with individual counts of
claims over the years. In some cases, information on whether at least one
accident has occurred or not in any year (rather than the exact number of
accidents in each year) is suﬃcient. Then, for each agent we only observe a
sequence of 0s (for years without accidents) and 1s (years with accidents).
• Finally, the minimum information that is needed to implement a bonus-
malus scheme may be even poorer. If all past accidents are treated sym-
metrically whatever their exact timing (as in our theoretical model), the
computation of a bonus-malus coeﬃcient only requires information on the
total number of past accidents. In our model, an agent who has been driving
for t periods and has had n accidents will be charged a premium of γnδt−n
times her initial premium, whatever the exact timing of each of the acci-
dents. In this case, a single draw from an insurance company’s files may
only give a cross-section of total counts of accidents for a group of clients
that has been driving for periods of varying length. Dynamics can only be
studied by comparing across individuals of diﬀerent (driving) seniority.
In each of these three cases, the dynamics of accidents can be used to test
for the presence of moral hazard, against the null that the accident probability
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does not depend on the agent’s incentives and only evolves according to some
predetermined law (possibly depending on observables, such as age of the driver,
age of the car, and others).
3.1. Heterogeneity versus moral hazard in continuous-time event-history
data
In the first case, the essence of the test is clear. Under moral hazard, the hazard
rate of an accident, conditional on observable and unobservable heterogeneity,
should be steadily increasing throughout any period without an accident and drop
discontinuously whenever an accident occurs. Under the null, however, the hazard
rate should not change after an accident. This can either be tested parametrically
or non-parametrically. Denote the number of claims up to and including time t
by N(t) and let X(t) be some vector of observable covariates (age, gender, etc.)
at time t. Abbring et al (forthcoming) assume that the intensity θ of claims,
conditional of the claim history {N (u) ; 0 ≤ u < t} and the covariate history
{X (u) ; 0 ≤ u ≤ t} up to time t takes the form
θ(t|λ, {N (u) ; 0 ≤ u < t}, {X (u) ; 0 ≤ u ≤ t}) = λβN(t−)ψ(t)eX(t)0γ,
where ψ is a fully non parametric baseline hazard function, β > 0 a scalar parame-
ter, λ a nonnegative unobservable covariate reflecting unobserved heterogeneity,
and γ a vector of parameters. Note that N(t−) is the number of claims up to,
but not including, time t. Thus, the parameter β > 0 captures true occurrence
dependence eﬀects. In the bonus-malus system described above, moral hazard
leads to a decline in the intensity of claims with the number of previous claims
(β < 1). Without moral hazard, we expect β = 1. Distinguishing these cases
(testing), and estimating β, is the focus of the empirical analysis. Statistical tests
are developed and applied to a French sample of 79, 684 contracts, of which 4, 831
have one claim in the contract year and 287 have two claims or more. The null
(β = 1) cannot be rejected at any conventional level, suggesting that moral hazard
is not a major problem in the data under consideration.
3.2. Testing for moral hazard from sequences of accident counts
When only the total numbers of accidents by year are known, we can develop
and apply similar methods for testing occurrence dependence in panel count data.
Here, we focus on the more challenging case in which we only observe an an-
nual sequence of 0s and 1s, corresponding to respectively years without and years
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with at least one accident, for each agent. Econometric procedures for testing for
occurrence dependence on such data have been developped by Heckman (1978,
1981 a,b), Honore (1993), Kyriazidou (1997) and Honore and Kyriazidou (2000).
They rely on the assumption that each agent’s accident probability remains con-
stant throughout the observation period (stationarity).6 To get the intuition in
a simple way, assume the system is malus only (i.e., the premium increases after
each accident, but does not decrease subsequently), and consider two sequences
of 4 years, A = (1, 0, 0, 0) and B = (0, 0, 0, 1), where a 1 (resp. 0) denotes the
occurrence of an accident (resp. no accident) during the correesponding year. In
the absence of moral hazard, and assuming away learning phenomena, the prob-
abilities of observing either of the two sequences should be exactly the same; in
both cases, the observed accident frequency is 25%. Under moral hazard, however,
the first sequence is more probable than the second: in A, the sequence of three
years without accidents happens after an accident, hence when the premium, and
consequently the marginal cost of future accidents and the incentives to take care
are maximum. In other words, for a given average frequency of accidents, the
timing of the occurrences can provide valuable information on the importance of
incentives.
The test described here assumes stationarity. The analogy with the methods
for continous-time data of Abbring et al. (forthcoming) discussed earlier suggests
that tests can be developed that are informative on moral hazard even if individual
accident probabilities may change over time for external reasons. Richer panel-
count data, that do not only record whether an accident has occurred at all but
also how many accidents have occurred in any year, may be helpful here. This is
on our research agenda.
3.3. Testing for moral hazard from total number of accidents only
Even in the case in which information is minimal - i.e., in which only the total
number of past accidents is known for each agent in the insurer’s data base -
it is still possible to test for moral hazard. In this case, we essentially have
a cross-section of total accident counts over the periods that agents have been
driving (seniority). Under additional stationarity assumptions, one can exploit
the variation in seniority in the data set to test for moral hazard. Specifically,
assume that (i) individual accident probabilities are constant over time, and (ii)
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the population is identical across
6In the duration model, this would correspond to a constant ψ.
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cohorts (seniority levels). That is, conditionally on observables, the no accident
probability p is distributed among the drivers of any given seniority according to
some distribution µ that is identical across seniorities. The idea of the test, as
developed by Chiappori and Heckman (2000), is the following. Under the null of
no moral hazard, for any driver with seniority t and no accident probability p, the
probability of having no accident throughout the observation period is pt. Hence
the proportion of drivers with no accident throughout the period is, under the
null, equal to
mt =
Z
ptdµ (p) ,
i.e., to the t-th moment of the distribution. It follows that the numbers m1,m2, ...
must, under the null, be the successive moments of the same distribution, which
generates a first set of restrictions (see Heckman 1978 and in a diﬀerent context
Chiappori 1985). In addition, one can see that again under the null, the propor-
tion, within the subpopulation of seniority t, of agents with exactly one accident
is
m1t =
Z
t pt−1 (1− p) dµ (p)
= t (mt−1 −mt) .
This provides a set of simple, linear restrictions involving three statistics, namely
mt−1,mt and m1t . Additional restrictions can be derived involving higher numbers
of accidents. An analogous analysis for the moral hazard case is required to judge
the power of tests based on these restrictions. These are topics for future research.
Note that, in any case, these tests involve a comparison of disjoint subpopulations
and heavily exploit stationarity assumptions.
3.4. Testing for adverse selection
In the three cases considered above, the null (no moral hazard) is consistent with
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, whatever its type. Such heterogeneity
reflects the impact of any variable that is not observed by the insurance com-
pany (and therefore the researcher), whether it is known by the insuree or not.
In other words, one does not, under the null, distinguish between adverse selec-
tion and symmetrically imperfect information. Testing for adverse selection (and
particularly asymmetric learning) requires analyzing the joint process followed by
accidents and contractual choices.
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In a dynamic setting, adverse selection can be modelled in various ways. One
way is to assume that each agent is characterized by some constant parameter
reflecting her ’quality’ as a driver, which is known by the agent but not by the
insurer at the beginning of the relationship. In this setting, adverse selection can
be tested using the simple, cross-sectional approach described in introduction.
In the case of automobile insurance, most existing analyses fail to find positive
conditional correlation, at least on populations of young drivers. This suggests
that adverse selection, if any, is not adequately described by the ’fixed quality
parameter’ story.
A more complex but also more convincing version relies on the asymmetric
learning argument sketched in the introduction. There, adverse selection gradually
emerges during the relationship. A natural empirical strategy is to study the
causal relationship between the sequences of accidents and contract choices (or
amendments). In particular, agents who learn their risk is above average are
more likely to switch to a contract entailing a more comprehensive coverage. The
previous (heterogeneity versus occurrence-dependence) perspective must then be
extended to a two-dimensional process. Again, this will be the topic of future
work.
References
Abbring, J.H., P.A. Chiappori and J. Pinquet (forthcoming), ’Moral
Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data’, Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation.
Cardon, J., and I. Hendel (1998): ’Asymmetric Information in Health
Insurance : Evidence From the National Health Expenditure Survey’, Mimeo,
Princeton University
Chiappori, P.A. (1985), ”Distribution of Income and the Law of Demand”,
Econometrica, 53, 109-127.
Chiappori, P.A. (2000), “Econometric Models of Insurance under Asym-
metric Information”, in G. Dionne, ed., Handbook of Insurance, North Holland.
Chiappori, P. A., F. Durand and P.Y. Geoﬀard (1998), “Moral Hazard
and the Demand for Physician Services : First Lessons from a French Natural
Experiment”, European Economic Review, 42, 499-511
10
Chiappori, P. A., P.Y. Geoﬀard and E. Kyriadizou (1998), “Cost of
Time, Moral Hazard, and the Demand for Physician Services”, Mimeo, University
of Chicago.
Chiappori, P. A. and J. Heckman (2000), ’Testing for moral hazard
on dynamic insurance data: theory and econometric tests’, Mimeo, University of
Chicago.
Chiappori, P. A., B. Jullien, B. Salanié and F. Salanié (2002), “Asym-
metric Information in Insurance: Some Testable Implications”, mimeo, University
of Chicago.
Chiappori, P. A. and B. Salanié (1996), “Empirical Contract Theory:
The Case of Insurance Data”, European Economic Review, 41, 943-51
Chiappori, P. A. and B. Salanié (2000), “Testing for Asymmetric Infor-
mation in Insurance Markets”, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56-78.
Chiappori, P. A. and B. Salanié (2003), ’Testing Contract Theory: a
Survey of Some Recent Work’, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics -
Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen
and P. Turnovsky, ed., Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 115-149.
Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux and C. Vanasse (1997), “The Informational
Content of Household Decisions, With an Application to Insurance under Adverse
Selection”, W.P., HEC, Montreal.
Dionne, G., M. Maurice, J. Pinquet and C. Vanasse (2001), ”The Role
of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in
Automobile Insurance”, mimeo, University of Montreal.
Dionne, G. and C. Vanasse (1992), “Automobile Insurance Ratemaking
in the Presence of Asymmetrical Information”, Journal of Applied Econometrics,
7, 149-65
Heckman, J.J. (1978): ”Simple statistical models for discrete panel data
developed and applied to test the hypothesis of true state dependence against the
hypothesis of spurious state dependence”, Annales de l’INSEE, 30-31, p. 227-269.
Heckman, J.J. (1981a): ”Statistical models for discrete panel data’, Struc-
tural Analysis of Discrete Panel Data with Econometric Applications, C. Manski
and D. McFadden, ed., Cambridge, MIT Press.
Heckman, J.J. (1981b): ”Heterogeneity and State Dependence’, Studies of
Labor Markets, S. Rosen, ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
Heckman, J.J. and G.J. Borjas (1980), “Does unemployment cause future
unemployment? Definitions, questions and answers from a continuous time model
11
of heterogeneity and state dependence”, Economica, 47, 247—283.
Hendel, I. and A. Lizzeri (1999): ”The Role of Commitment in Dynamic
Contracts : Evidence from Life Insurance”, Working Paper, Princeton University.
Holly, A., L. Gardiol, G. Domenighetti and B. Bisig (1998), “An
Econometric Model of Health Care Utilization and Health Insurance in Switzer-
land”, European Economic Review, 42, 513-522.
Honore, B (1993), “Orthogonality Conditions for Tobit Models with Fixed
Eﬀects and Lagged Dependant Variables”, Journal of Econometrics, 59, 35-61.
Honore, B, and E. Kyriazidou (2000), “Panel Data Discrete Choice Mod-
els with Lagged Dependant Variables”,Econometrica, 68, 839-74.
Kyriazidou, E. (1997), ”Estimation of Panel Data Sample Selection Mod-
els”, Econometrica, 65, 1335-64.
Poterba, J., and A. Finkelstein (2003), ”Adverse Selection in Insurance
Markets: Policyholder Evidence From the U.K. Annuity Market”, Mimeo, MIT.
Puelz, R. and A. Snow (1994), “Evidence on Adverse Selection : Equi-
librium Signalling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market”, Journal of
Political Economy, 102, 236-57.
Richaudeau, D. (1999): ”Automobile insurance contracts and risk of acci-
dent: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data”, The Geneva Papers on
Risk and Insurance Theory, 24, 97-114
12
